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INTRODUCTION 
As the existence of socio-economic differentials in health and health service 
utilization becomes more widely recognized, policymakers at the national and 
international levels have become more concerned with how best to redress these 
inequalities. A key strategic choice is whether to target increased resources directly 
towards the poor or whether to provide the same benefits to all, irrespective of their 
income; and if targeting is to occur, how best to do it. In this chapter we use the 
definition of targeting given by Mooij: the identification and selection of certain 
groups, households or individuals and the distribution of benefits to them (Mooij 
1999). In this chapter we review the alternative approaches to targeting that have been 
used in health and other sectors, and draw together the existing evidence about their 
effectiveness.  
 
In selecting examples of targeting we have been challenged by the need to define the 
boundary between approaches that attempt to target resources towards the poor versus 
those which attempt more generally to improve equity. We feel the answer lies in 
drawing a distinction between ‘principles of equity’ and ‘operational izing equity’. 
Targeting essentially involves positive discrimination by treating different groups of 
individuals differently. This is consistent with the principle of vertical equity that is 
defined as the unequal, but fair, treatment of unequals (Mooney 1996). In recent times 
there has been increasing acknowledgement that vertical equity can, and should, be 
considered in any formulation of equity (Mooney and Jan 1997). However, in 
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acknowledging vertical equity, an additional layer of value judgements is necessarily 
brought into the analysis. These are perhaps more difficult to address than in the case 
of horizontal equity (the equal treatment of equals) because they require statements 
about the extent of any difference in how individuals or groups should be treated if 
vertical equity is to be achieved (Wiseman and Jan 2000). They also require 
statements about how these groups should be identified and the mechanisms and 
methods used to deliver resources to them. In this chapter, ‘targeting’ represents the 
means for putting into practice the principle of vertical equity.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The targeting definition introduced above emphasizes a number of the key elements 
of targeting policies: how individuals or groups are selected, the nature of the benefit 
involved, and the way such benefits are distributed. However, the literature on 
targeting uses a wide variety of terminologies and organizing principles for describing 
targeting approaches, largely because it emerges from a variety of fields including 
education, social policy and economics. In this chapter we propose a unifying 
terminology and conceptual framework for describing the different elements and key 
choices involved in a targeted transfer programme (Worrall, Wiseman et al. 2003). 
 
Why target? Targeted vs. universal programmes compared 
At the heart of the targeting issue is the question of how best to raise the well-being of 
the poor by transferring resources to them. The debate is usually characterized as a 
choice between universal benefits vs. targeted benefits (see Chapter 7 [BENNETT]). 
Under universal programmes, all members of a given population are eligible to 
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receive programme benefits, while targeted programmes restrict benefits to some sub-
group of the population.  
 
It is important to assess targeted approaches against their objectives. Too often these 
objectives are not clearly stated. There are a number of reasons why policymakers 
might choose a targeted approach to providing benefits. These can be broadly 
categorized as relating to equity, efficiency and sustainability.  
 
Equity is commonly cited as an objective of targeting transfers. By focusing resources 
on those identified as being in greatest need, a targeted approach allows them to 
benefit disproportionately. Also, compared with a universal transfer, the per capita 
amount of resources transferred may be greater for a given budget if the resources are 
targeted to specific groups. Another dimension of equity is the level of social 
protection that some targeting programmes offer recipients. It has been noted that 
targeted resources may protect the vulnerable during periods of economic change 
(Alderman and Lindert 1998); Alderman and Lindert 1998). 
 
A second justification for targeting is efficiency. There are a number of issues 
involved here. First, with limited resources available for transfers, channelling them 
directly to those in greatest need or with greatest ability to benefit will ensure that 
these resources are most effectively used. This assumes that the cost of reaching all 
individuals is the same, but that certain groups will benefit more from each unit of 
subsidy. Secondly, targeting subsidies can reduce the overall cost of a programme, 
compared with universal benefits. A third dimension of efficiency relates to whether a 
transfer actually results in a change in individual behaviour. For example, if a subsidy 
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to purchase a commodity such as an insecticide-treated mosquito net (ITN) is 
provided to an individual who would otherwise have purchased the net at the full 
price, no change in behaviour is induced by the subsidy and it can be said to be 
inefficient. Targeting may be used to avoid this inefficiency by focussing on those 
who would not otherwise have been able to access the good in question. Efficiency 
can be further enhanced if resources are used to induce a desired action which has 
positive externalities. 
 
A third argument in favour of targeting is sustainability. Sustainability has multiple 
dimensions in this context. First, fiscal sustainability will be influenced by the overall 
cost of the programme; to the extent that this cost can be reduced by focusing 
resources on those most in need, fiscal sustainability may be enhanced. A second 
issue is political sustainability, which relates to the continued political commitment 
and support for targeting. One risk of a targeted approach is what has become known 
as the ‘paradox of targeting’ (Besley and Kanbur 1993, Gelbach and Pritchett 1997, 
Conning and Kevane 2001). This refers to the fact that the more narrowly targeted a 
programme becomes, the less political support it may garner, eventually undermining 
its sustainability. Setting a broader target group may be necessary to ‘buy off’ 
potential opponents of a narrowly targeted scheme and avoid social division. A further 
dimension of sustainability relates to the potential for state programmes to crowd out 
the private sector, eliminating a potential future source of supply (Hanson, 
Kumaranayake et al. 2001). By narrowing the group of beneficiaries of public 
transfers, a targeted approach may help to reduce the impact of public action on the 
viability of an existing or potential private sector.  
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What is being targeted – defining the benefit  
In health and social policy, a range of different types of resource have been targeted 
towards specific groups. These include products, services, vouchers and cash which 
are subsidized by a government or other public body. For instance, a programme in 
Kenya targeted free insecticide-treated mosquito nets to pregnant women visiting 
public antenatal services (Guyatt HL, Gotink MH et al. 2002). Many countries have 
policies to exempt patients from payment of user fees for health services on grounds 
of poverty (Gilson, Russell et al. 1995), which can be seen as a form of targeted 
subsidy. More recently there have been experiments to target the distribution of an 
entitlement to a good or service, in the form of a voucher which can be redeemed as 
full or part payment. Social welfare programmes in a number of Latin American 
countries have developed programmes to distribute cash benefits to poor households 
in exchange for participation in priority social services such as education, health and 
nutrition (Mesoamerica Nutrition Program Targeting Study Group 2002). Finally, 
information or marketing messages promoting specific commodities or behaviour 
change can be targeted to specific groups, through the choice of medium and location. 
Targeted marketing can channel information towards a specific high-risk group; or be 
used to reinforce the targeting of a product or service. For instance, the promotion of 
social marketing condoms (a product) can be targeted to lower income groups through 
information conveyed in media that are more likely to reach the poor, such as radio or 
community performances in rural areas. 
 
Targeted resources vary in their degree of transferability, which will influence 
programme achievements. It is useful to distinguish reallocations between individuals 
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(where a beneficiary can transfer the resource to a non-target person) and between 
goods/services (where a benefit can be exchanged for an unintended good).  
 
Cash, products and vouchers can all be easily transferred between individuals, raising 
the possibility that a targeted benefit will ‘leak’ to a non-target individual. However, 
the nature of the benefit, and the design of the distribution system, may limit the 
degree to which such transfers occur. For example, a voucher programme in 
Nicaragua provided sex workers with vouchers for reproductive health services in 
nominated private clinics (Gorter, Sandiford et al. 1999). While it was possible for the 
initial recipient of the voucher to transfer it to somebody else, it is relatively unlikely 
that a non-sex-worker would want to receive and use the voucher. A national-level 
targeted voucher scheme for ITNs in Tanzania requires the woman’s antenatal care 
card to be presented at the time of redemption, reducing opportunities for transfer. 
Other benefits such as exemptions from payment, or direct provision of services such 
as health services or training programmes, are least amenable to being transferred to 
other individuals.  
 
Cash is highly transferable between people and across goods and services. A cash 
benefit intended to increase food consumption within the household, for example, 
may be used for other purposes. Depending on programme design and monitoring, it 
may be possible for vouchers to be redeemed against non-target goods and services, 
though the degree to which this happens in practice is unknown. Local market 
conditions may allow benefits in the form of products to be exchanged for other 
commodities; but payment exemptions and direct receipt of services cannot generally 
be transferred.  
 7 
 
Who to target 
Although the focus of this review is on programmes which target the poor, it is 
important to recognize that much of the experience with targeting in the health field 
derives from targeting of those who are at greatest health risk or with greatest capacity 
to benefit from an intervention (Culyer 1995). These groups may or may not overlap 
with the ‘poor’, depending on the degree of correlation of biological and economic 
vulnerability. 
 
The size of the target group will have implications for resource requirements, though 
some of the gains from having a narrower group may be lost through the additional 
resources required to identify a smaller group of beneficiaries. There are also 
operational implications of choice of target group since methods to identify 
beneficiaries are needed. Where the intervention targets the poor, this raises the 
important issue of how best to identify them given the multidimensionality and 
context-specificity of poverty. Assessing the accuracy of targeting mechanisms also 
requires defining a ‘gold standard’ for identifying the population of interest. Most 
recent studies have used per capita consumption (with or without equivalence 
adjustment) as the gold standard measure of poverty. However, this narrow money-
metric definition of poverty may fail to capture other forms of deprivation and 
capability (Sen 1985, Falkingham and Namazie 2002).  
 
How to target: targeting methods and mechanisms 
The literature contains a number of different classifications of targeting approaches 
(van de Walle 1998, Jaspars and Shoham 1999), none of which is entirely satisfactory 
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as targeting is a complex process and there are always cases which fall into multiple 
categories. Different dimensions of targeting programmes include the degree to which 
they rely on administrative systems, community members or self-selection to identify 
beneficiaries; whether they involve individual assessments of economic status or rely 
on proxy indicators; and whether they attempt to identify individuals/groups or focus 
on categories of spending. Following Conning and Kevane (2001), we distinguish 
here between the targeting method, which refers to the way beneficiaries are 
identified, and the broader targeting mechanism, which refers to the broader delivery 
strategy which may include the choice of intermediary for identifying beneficiaries, 
the channels for delivery of the benefit and the overall organizational design.  
 
Targeting methods 
Three main methods for identifying beneficiaries can be distinguished: individual 
assessment; identification through categorical or geographical indicators; and self-
selection.  
 
Individual assessment: This involves identification of individuals who are eligible for 
a benefit on a case-by-case basis, usually through some kind of means test. Individual 
or household income can be assessed directly, though this is difficult, time consuming 
and subject to misreporting (Gilson, Russell et al. 1995). Alternatively, one or more 
proxy indicators of individual socio-economic status may be assessed, for example, 
ownership of land and other assets, sex of household head (with the presumption that 
female-headed households are poorer than male-headed ones). The 
multidimensionality of poverty means that it may be important to use multiple 
indicators which are able to capture different aspects of deprivation.   For example, 
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the social safety net programme that was implemented in Indonesia in the aftermath of 
the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s used the following criteria to define 
eligibility:  families who did not eat twice daily or did not bring their sick members to 
health centres, families whose head-of-householdlost his/her job due to a mass 
dismissal, and families with children who dropped out of school due to financial 
reasons.  Eligible families were identified in each village by teams consisting of 
government and non-government workers, and all households defined as poor 
received a health card entitling them to free health services (Saadah, Pradhan et al. 
2001, Suci 2006).    
 
Categorical/geographical indicators: In contrast to individual assessment, this 
method involves identifying beneficiaries by an easily observable characteristic, such 
as demographic group (age, single mothers), ethnic group, or even disease diagnosis 
(TB patients or HIV/AIDS patients). This also includes geographic targeting, in which 
all residents of a geographically defined area are eligible for the transfer. An 
important determinant of the effectiveness of a geographic targeting method is the 
degree of heterogeneity of the population in a given area, with greater heterogeneity 
associated with greater targeting errors (see below) 
 
Self-selection: In this form of targeting, the benefit (e.g. a subsidy) is available to all, 
but is designed to be more attractive to the target population so that they self-select a 
product or into a programme, while non- members of the target group choose to 
remain outside. This approach is sometimes referred to as ‘market segmentation’, in 
which the available products or services are designed to appeal to different segments 
or sub-groups of the market, who choose according to their preferences and 
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willingness and ability to pay, and in so doing distribute themselves in a way which 
maximizes coverage (of the target group) and minimizes leakage. Social marketing 
projects often use this approach, supplying both higher-price, premium brand products 
which appeal to the non-poor, and free or very highly subsidized brands which are 
available to everybody but more likely to be chosen by the poor (Thomas, 
Killingsworth et al. 1998). In food relief programmes, subsidies may be provided for 
inferior products (such as yellow maize meal or dark, rough flour) that are 
disproportionately consumed by the poor and shunned by the rich (Alderman and 
Lindert 1998).  
 
Differentiation on the basis of the quantity of a good supplied can also be used to 
encourage self-selection. For example, the small loans involved in micro-credit 
schemes offer a means of segmenting the market since only the poor are inclined to 
borrow such small amounts. Alternatively, self-selection may be achieved through the 
process by which the good or service is obtained, for example, requiring queuing or 
some form of stigmatization such as shopping in a ration shop (see (Alderman and 
Lindert 1998). Attempts to attract the relatively better-off to higher priced services 
have been made, for example providing a ‘fast-track’ for health services in which the 
quality of care does not differ but the time spent in the queue does (Thomas, 
Killingsworth et al. 1998). Marketing strategies can be used to reinforce market 
segmentation by influencing perceptions of the nature of the target group for each 
brand (e.g. affordability vs. quality); or by using advertising media that are more 
accessible to specific population groups.  
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This taxonomy of targeting methods is not mutually exclusive: targeting mechanisms 
can combine one or more of these approaches. For example, the PROGRESA 
programme in Mexico (now known as Opportunidades) providing cash benefits 
combines geographic targeting with individual assessment within qualifying locations 
(Skoufias, Davis et al. 2001).  
 
Targeting mechanisms 
Targeting mechanisms refer to the broader delivery strategy. This can include the 
channels for delivery of the benefit and the choice of intermediary for identifying 
beneficiaries. 
 
In terms of delivering the benefit, each of the methods for identifying beneficiaries 
can be used in a variety of different targeting mechanisms. Table 8.1 shows one 
classification of mechanisms, and also gives examples of each. More specific details 
of these schemes and a review of the evidence of their effectiveness follow in the 
section ‘Review of Evidence’. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8.1 AROUND HERE] 
 
A further dimension of targeting mechanisms is the intermediary responsible for 
actually identifying beneficiaries. These may be administrative authorities, health 
workers, community members or groups, or in the case of self-selection, the 
beneficiaries themselves. The choice of intermediary may influence the effectiveness 
of the targeting mechanism (coverage and leakage of benefits – see ‘Criteria for 
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evaluation’ below), the cost of targeting, and have other consequences such as the 
reinforcement or undermining of community cohesion (Conning and Kevane 2001).  
 
There is a small but growing literature on the use of community-based intermediaries 
in targeting programmes. These studies have primarily figured in the complex 
emergencies literature where ‘beneficiary selection is commonly carried out by its 
own community members’ (Jaspars and Shoham 1999). This choice of intermediary 
has been a response to the inability of outsiders to effectively target on the basis of 
socio-economic criteria (Jaspars and Shoham 1999). Local representatives are 
commonly required to select households without livestock, with little available labour, 
or female-headed households who are not receiving support from relatives. Targeting 
programmes may rely on community leaders or elders, local government or 
committees made up of representatives from the local community. They tend to be 
appointed by the community and their main responsibility is to identify vulnerable 
individuals and families to be targeted.  
 
Using community members as intermediaries in targeting programmes has been 
advocated on the basis that superior information is often available to communities 
about their members’ circumstances(Conning and Kevane 2001). Compared with 
external agents, community members may know more about each others’ resources, 
needs and circumstances without having to gather any data beyond what they see in 
the course of daily transactions (Jaspars and Shoham 1999). Because community 
members are linked by multiple and complex relationships, there may be greater 
consequences from hiding or misusing information, possibly leading to less leakage 
and therefore more accurate targeting. Also, from the narrow perspective of the 
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funders, the costs may be lower because community members are often not paid for 
their time or expertise, and the community rather than the programme meets expenses 
such as travel and communications costs. This raises concerns about the fairness of 
imposing these costs on the community. On the downside, communities may face 
internal political or power divisions that influence the allocation of resources in ways 
that may undermine equity. The objectives of communities may differ from those of 
an external agency. In this circumstance, it is important to recognize the potentially 
diverging goals of the different intermediaries. 
 
Criteria for evaluation 
The most common criteria used to evaluate targeted programmes are the degree to 
which the programme reaches its intended beneficiaries (‘coverage’) and the quantity 
of benefits that is captured by non-target groups (‘leakage’1). These two concepts can 
be described in terms of the two-by-two table, Table 8.2, which relates the intended or 
targeted beneficiaries to the actual beneficiaries.  
 
[NSERT TABLE 8.2 AROUND HERE] 
 
Undercoverage, which is the complement of coverage, and leakage are often 
described as ‘targeting errors’ (Cornia and Stewart 1993) and provide two criteria 
against which specific targeting approaches can be assessed, often in comparison with 
a universal approach. It is possible for a programme to experience both undercoverage 
and leakage simultaneously, with undercoverage arising from a failure to identify 
potential beneficiaries and address the barriers to uptake; and leakage arising from 
inaccurate identification of the target group, incentive effects and deliberate 
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corruption. It is important to consider the appropriate timescale over which 
undercoverage should be measured, particularly when comparing across programmes. 
Longer-standing programmes might be expected to have achieved higher levels of 
coverage than more recently implemented ones.  
 
While coverage and leakage are the primary outcomes considered in the targeting 
literature, other criteria are also important. These include the cost of targeting, its 
impact on the broader delivery system, and political feasibility and sustainability. 
When considering targeting costs, a societal perspective should be taken to ensure that 
the full costs of contributions outside the administrative system, such as community 
involvement, are accounted for.  
 
More recently, there has been interest in the effects of certain types of public 
intervention on the broader delivery system. One concern has been the degree to 
which the private sector is ‘crowded out’ by the public sector, with implications for 
efficiency and sustainability. A priori, it would be expected that the more narrowly 
targeted the benefits, the lower the degree of crowding out; however, this has not been 
investigated empirically. The potential for crowding out by widely targeted benefits 
was shown in an evaluation of an ITN project, which found that sales of a more-
subsidized net to all pregnant women and under-fives reduced the sales of a less-
subsidized net (Hanson and Jones 2000).  
 
Having set out these criteria, however, it is striking how little information is available 
to assess the effectiveness of targeting approaches. To the degree that the approaches 
described below were evaluated, most looked primarily at coverage of target groups 
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and a few at the degree of leakage to non-target groups. Very few studies considered 
the costs of the targeting approach, and hardly any the effects of the programme on 
broader public and private delivery systems.  
 
REVIEW OF EVIDENCE 
This section provides an overview of the way six different targeting mechanisms have 
been applied in the health sector (resource allocation formulae, contracting NGOs, 
user fee exemptions, cash transfers, vouchers and market segmentation strategies). 
These studies have been purposively selected on the basis that they are documented in 
the literature, they provide some insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different mechanisms for targeting benefits to different groups, and do so across a 
range of settings. Table 8.3 summarizes these different approaches in terms of the 
conceptual framework outlined above: who is targeted; what is the targeted benefit; 
what is the targeting method; and what evaluation criteria are used to assess impact. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8.3 AROUND HERE] 
 
Resource allocation formulae 
Resource (re-)allocation mechanisms are usually adopted to address existing 
inequalities in the geographic distribution of health services, with socio-economic 
differences underlying these geographical patterns. In this case, the benefit being 
targeted is increased spending in specified geographic areas. Many such mechanisms 
trace their roots to the Resource Allocation Working Party (RAWP), which set out to 
redress inequalities in resource allocation in the UK National Health Service (RAWP 
1976). According to the definition proposed in the Introduction, resource allocation 
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formulae can amount to targeting where they set out to address a vertical equity 
objective, such as greater resources for those in greater health need. They therefore 
need to go beyond simply equalizing per capita allocations across geographic areas, 
and include adjustments for socio-economic status (as a proxy for health need, 
assuming that health needs are greater for poorer individuals); and sometimes more 
directly for health indicators such as standardized mortality ratios, age and sex 
distribution (Pearson 2002, Goudge, Khumalo et al. 2003, Ensor, Hossain et al. 
Forthcoming). A benefit of formula-based approaches is the transparency that may be 
brought to the process of resource allocation, though in practice this may be limited 
by keeping certain forms of funding outside the formula (e.g. conditional grants, top-
slicing), and also political influence on allocation of actual expenditure compared 
with budgets.  
 
While a number of low- and middle-income countries have considered proposals to 
adopt resource allocation formulae to increase the equity of health expenditure – such 
as Bangladesh (Ensor, Hossain et al. Forthcoming) and Balochistan province, Pakistan 
(Green, Ali et al. 2000) - few countries have fully implemented such approaches. 
Furthermore, not all resource allocation formulae have included measures of poverty 
or health need. This review located two examples where such policies were actually 
implemented: South Africa (Gilson, Doherty et al. 1999) and Zambia (Lake, Daura et 
al. 2000). In Cambodia, a resource allocation formula was adopted which included 
only population and measures of cost and workload (Pearson 2002), and therefore did 
not address vertical equity. A study of the decentralization process in Chile and 
Colombia considered the degree to which decentralization policy provides 
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opportunities to address geographic inequalities in health expenditure (Bossert, 
Larranaga et al. 2003).  
 
The main criterion against which such policies are assessed is their progress towards 
increasing need-adjusted per capita health expenditure. Of course, this criterion is 
unable to reflect the degree to which resources are actually consumed by the poor.  
 
South Africa (source: (Gilson, Doherty et al. 1999)): Two policy regimes in the post-
apartheid period have attempted to address inequalities among provinces in per capita 
health expenditure. 
 
An initial resource allocation formula took account of population size weighted by 
provincial per capita income in order to allocate proportionately greater resources to 
poorer provinces. In the second year, the formula was modified, replacing provincial 
per capita income with a measure of private health insurance coverage, as public 
resources were intended for those who did not have access to private sources.  
 
From 1997/98 a fiscal federal regime has also used a population-based formula to 
allocate block grants (‘global budgets’) to the provinces, of which 85 per cent is to be 
spent on the social sector (education, health and social services). However, the 
provinces have greater discretion over how they allocate those funds. The formula 
used to allocate provincial global budgets includes population size, but is also 
influenced by historical patterns of resource allocation and provincial contributions to 
tax revenue. This latter feature tends to reinforce existing patterns of economic 
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privilege, and, according to the definition of targeting adopted in this review, would 
be an inequitable vertical targeting approach.  
 
In assessing the effects of the policy, greater progress appears to have been made in 
equalizing health expenditure per capita under the health sector resource allocation 
formula regime. In most provinces, expenditure per capita shifted towards the national 
average. This took place, however, in the context of an overall increase in resources 
available for health, which helped to soften the impact of the decreases in funds for 
the better-resourced provinces. The process of redistribution slowed under the fiscal 
federalism regime. Most of the richer provinces increased their relative share of 
expenditure, and in poorer provinces, progress was halted or even reversed. Lacking a 
mechanism at the national and provincial levels to promote equitable health spending, 
health allocations are subject to political influence at the provincial level.  
 
Zambia (source: (Lake, Daura et al. 2000)): In 1994 a formula for allocating resources 
among districts was introduced in Zambia. The formula was initially based on 
population, with weights for population density (less densely populated areas were 
assumed to have higher costs) and the presence of referral facilities. In 1995 a more 
comprehensive formula was proposed, which included additional indicators of local 
costs (index of fuel prices), health need (prone to cholera/dysentery outbreaks), and 
deprivation (whether the district has a bank/service station).  
 
The introduction of a formula-based approach in 1994 had a broadly positive effect on 
resource allocation, with inequities reduced in all but two provinces. It should be 
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noted, however, that the formula excluded salaries and drugs, and addressed only 
about 40 per cent of total district-level resources.  
 
Contracting NGOs to provide health services in rural areas 
Many countries are experimenting with contracting NGOs to provide health services 
in rural areas. NGOs are often favoured because of their greater capacity to serve 
marginalized populations. Contracting NGOs provides potential to target health 
services to the poor where it is combined with specification of a service package 
which emphasizes primary health care. Contracting is being used within many current 
global initiatives (e.g. projects funded by the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and 
Malaria, and PEPFAR, the (US) President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief).  
 
Cambodia has experimented with contracting of management and delivery of health 
services on a pilot basis, together with careful evaluation of the experience with a 
before-after with control group research design (Bhushan, Keller et al. 2002). Two 
different contracting models at the district level were compared with a control group 
of directly managed government districts.  In the ‘contracted out’ districts, contracted 
NGOs had full management control over the district, including employing their own 
staff. ‘Contracting-in districts’ involved NGOs in management support to public 
sector providers. Health facility and household surveys were conducted at baseline 
and 2.5 years after implementation.  
 
The results of the final survey indicate that the contracted districts performed better 
than the control districts with respect to most of the health service coverage indictors. 
Additionally, both contracting models were associated with a substantially greater 
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increase in curative visits by those in the poorest half of the population, with an 
increase of 1,096 per cent in the contracted out districts and 490 per cent in the 
contracted-in districts, compared with 82 per cent in the control districts. Higher use 
of preventive care by the poorest half of the population (as indicated by vitamin A 
distribution) was also noted among the contracted districts. Out-of-pocket payments 
by the poorest were significantly reduced in the contracting districts (with the 
exception of those contracted-in districts which did not introduce user fees, in which it 
was found that because they could not pay adequate compensation to staff, under-the-
table payments and private practice persisted). The improvements in equity arising in 
the contracting districts were attributed to a combination of improved service 
availability in more remote parts of the district, where the poor are more likely to live; 
decreased private expenditure on ineffective services; and decreased travel costs.  
 
A study of the process in one district with ‘contracted-in’ district management reveals 
some of the mechanisms through which these improvements were made (Soeters and 
Griffiths 2003). Following a period of individual health worker contracts which 
proved unwieldy, sub-contracts were agreed between the district management and 
individual facilities which decentralized authority to facility managers. Managers 
were able to choose the structure of incentive payments, control personnel 
management decisions, and control the allocation of recurrent resources. 
Arrangements included incentives to traditional birth attendants to refer mothers to 
deliver at health facilities (leading to a 550 per cent increase in facility deliveries), 
probationary periods for staff, and local recruitment of additional staff where these 
were needed. This study also confirmed the importance of reduction in informal fee 
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charging in the reduction in out-of-pocket payments from $18 before the reforms to 
$11 per capita annual expenditure.  
 
Guatemala has also contracted with NGOs with the specific aim of extending basic 
health services to remote, indigenous populations using a geographic targeting 
approach. The Programa de Extension de Cobertura de Servicios Basicos (PECSB – 
Program to extend coverage of basic health services) began in the wake of the 1996 
Peace Accords, with the first pilot agreements with NGOs in 1997 and extended by 
2002 to 160 agreements with 88 NGOs, covering 3 million people (La Forgia, Mintz 
et al. Forthcoming). NGOs are contracted to provide a basic service package including 
maternal and child care, illness management, emergency care and environmental 
services, and are paid on a capitation basis. There is little information available about 
the impact of PECSB. Some evidence indicates that the proportion of the population 
without access to health services (defined as >1 hour from facility) fell dramatically 
over the period of implementation from 46 per cent in 1996 to 9 per cent in 1999, 
though there were a number of reforms underway at the same time. Immunization 
coverage rates are reported to have increased as has antenatal coverage (Nieves and 
La Forgia 2000, Gragnolati and Marini 2003).  
 
User fee exemptions 
Evidence of the effectiveness of systems to exempt certain groups from payment of 
user fees provides helpful insight into the effectiveness and feasibility of direct 
targeting, together with the interaction between targeting mechanisms and health 
system incentives. Exemptions may be targeted at individuals on the basis of poverty 
(direct targeting); or demographic group, disease status or profession (characteristic 
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targeting). This literature has been comprehensively reviewed elsewhere (e.g. Gilson 
1997). An important issue, however, is the conflict of interest faced by health workers 
where they carry the responsibility for deciding who to exempt from payment.  
 
This conflict in health service objectives between equity and resource generation is 
addressed in experiments with an ‘Equity Fund’ in Cambodia (Hardeman, Van 
Damme et al. 2004). The approach recognized the problems of conflict of interest and 
lack of specialized skills and time to make individual exemption decisions. To address 
them, a NGO-administered Health Equity Fund was created that identifies the poor 
and pays user fees for hospital services on their behalf. An evaluation of the impact of 
the fund found a steady increase in the number of people benefiting from the fund, 
rising to about 30 per cent of all hospitalized patients. High levels of coverage of the 
poor and minimal leakage of the subsidy to non-target groups were achieved, with the 
fund supporting nearly all of those assessed as ‘poor’ or ‘extremely poor’ who came 
to the hospital and benefiting only one non-poor individual. A contributing factor to 
the success of the fund was the cessation of informal charges. The total cost of the 
fund was $1,084 per month of which approximately 60 per cent went to direct 
financial assistance (fees, transport and other basic items) and 40 per cent for 
administration costs. The cost per beneficiary was $18.86 and per district resident just 
$0.06. 
 
Cash transfers 
Cash transfers have been targeted at the poor through large-scale social programmes 
in Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico (Mesoamerica Nutrition Program Targeting 
Study Group 2002). All three provide cash benefits to poor families in exchange for 
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participation in specified health, nutrition and education services. The targeting 
criteria, benefits and service attendance requirements are summarized in Table 8.4. 
The Honduras and Nicaragua programmes use primarily geographic criteria, though 
within selected census districts households are excluded if they own a vehicle or more 
than 14 hectares of farming land; these criteria exclude only 2.5 per cent of the 
population in the selected districts. The Mexico programme includes direct targeting 
within the identified localities, with an index that includes household characteristics 
such as asset ownership.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8.4 AROUND HERE] 
 
A benefit incidence analysis of the effectiveness of the targeting procedures was 
undertaken by comparing the results of the programme procedures with national-level 
survey data on living conditions which allowed deciles of per capita expenditure to be 
constructed. The analysis allows the share of benefits captured by different 
expenditures to be calculated. All three programmes were found to be relatively well 
targeted, with 22.1, 22 and 32.6 per cent of benefits captured by the lowest decile in 
Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua, respectively. Cumulatively, nearly 90 per cent of 
benefits were captured by the poorest 50 per cent of the population in Honduras and 
Nicaragua, with only 71 per cent captured by the poorest 50 per cent in Mexico. The 
poorer performance of the Mexico programme was argued to be partly a result of the 
revision of household-level criteria in a later stage of the programme.  
 
Vouchers 
 24 
Vouchers provide an entitlement to a good or service, with the recipient generally free 
to choose among a number of different providers. The attraction of the voucher 
approach is that it can create a degree of competition on the supply side, with 
providers vying for customers on the basis of the quality or price of the service they 
provide. Depending on the design of the system as a whole, there is the potential for a 
voucher system to reinforce and strengthen a private sector delivery system, thereby 
potentially contributing to sustainability.  
 
Vouchers are better described as a targeting mechanism than a targeting method, as a 
range of different approaches to identifying the beneficiaries and distributing the 
vouchers themselves can be used. In the health field, the target groups for voucher 
programmes have generally been those who are biologically vulnerable rather than the 
poor. Two programmes for which evaluation results are available are a programme 
delivering vouchers for reproductive health services for sex workers in Nicaragua, and 
vouchers for ITNs for pregnant women in Tanzania. 
 
The Nicaraguan programme has been distributing vouchers to sex workers in 
Managua since 1995, and allows these workers to receive a package of health services 
from designated providers. The agreements with the providers are renewed annually 
and provide opportunities for monitoring, training and, if services are inadequate, for 
replacement with alternative providers. Two thousand vouchers are distributed every 
6 months to sex workers and, in later rounds, their partners or clients (Gorter, 
Sandiford et al. 1999, Sandiford, Gorter et al. 2002).  
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From 1996 to 2000 the KINET project in Tanzania distributed vouchers to pregnant 
women through maternal and child health (MCH) clinics, providing them with a 
discount of TSh.500 off the TSh.3,000 cost of a net from designated social marketing 
retailers. An evaluation of the scheme found that on the one hand, 97 per cent of all 
vouchers received by women were redeemed for a net; but at the same time only 12 
per cent of pregnant women had used a voucher, indicating problems of information, 
knowledge and awareness among both women and MCH clinic staff (Mushi, 
Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 2003).  
 
Voucher programmes require a mechanism for identifying eligible individuals and 
trying to maximize coverage and minimize leakage. In Nicaragua, sex workers were 
identified at 50-60 prostitution sites in and around Managua (Sandiford, Gorter et al. 
2002). In the Tanzanian programme, all pregnant women attending antenatal care 
services and children under 5 years of age were eligible (a characteristic targeting 
approach). The evidence above reveals substantial problems of undercoverage with 
the Tanzanian project. 
 
With a benefit in the form of a voucher, transferability across persons and across 
services is a potential risk. In the case of the sex worker programme, it was decided 
not to worry about transfers across individuals since the recipient was likely to be at 
as high, if not higher, risk of a sexually transmitted disease as the initial beneficiary. It 
is also unlikely in this programme that the provider clinics would agree to provide 
some other kind of service in place of the designated sexual health package.  
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A recent study tracking vouchers in the KINET project from recipient through to 
redemption point reported only one case where the voucher had been transferred from 
one individual to another; though there were many cases where the original recipient 
of the voucher could not be located. The latter findings may have been attributable to 
health workers making up names of recipients and selling or giving the vouchers to 
others outside the intended target group, or women may have sold or given their 
voucher to other people (Tami et al. 2004).  
 
Market segmentation 
As described above, market segmentation using self-selection as a targeting method 
relies on individual choices about what services to consume and in what quantities. 
Often there is some manipulation of the service or commodity characteristics in order 
to increase its appeal to the target group and reduce its appeal to non-targeted 
individuals. This can also include influencing the locations where it is provided or 
sold and the media and messages used to promote it. The main criteria used to assess 
market segmentation as a mechanism are the degree of coverage and leakage, usually 
examined through the socio-economic characteristics of users of the targeted service, 
compared with alternatives. 
 
Most of the evidence on market segmentation comes from the experience of targeting 
subsidized contraceptive commodities, especially when these are distributed and sold 
using a social marketing approach. In the health sector, social marketing involves the 
application of commercial marketing technologies to public health interventions and 
behaviours.  
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Evidence from Bangladesh, Honduras, Indonesia, Mexico, Nepal and Pakistan 
shows that users of subsidized contraceptive social marketing (CSM) sources came 
from lower socio-economic levels than contraceptors as a whole (Lande and Geller 
1991). CSM users had lower family income (Nepal), lower ownership of key 
indicator goods (Mexico) and lower monthly expenditure (Indonesia). (Stover and 
Bollinger 1989) found that more than 85 per cent of CSM users in the Dominican 
Republic, Barbados, Colombia and Jamaica came from lower socio-economic 
groups.  
 
An important issue with self-selection is the degree to which new CSM users are 
switching from other sources of supply. To the extent that they are switching from 
full-priced commercial sources, this is seen as inefficient (subsidizing people to do 
what they were otherwise doing); if they are switching from more highly subsidized, 
free public sources, this may result in a net reduction in cost and therefore an 
efficiency increase. This assumes, however, that those who were previously willing 
to pay were not doing so at the expense of great sacrifice. (Lande and Geller 1991) 
cite a review of eight programmes which found that new users are generally 30 per 
cent or more of the total; and that the number of new users and switchers from other 
subsidized sources is generally higher than those from commercial sources. No 
evidence was available about the origins of switchers from other methods. In 
contrast, a study of oral contraceptive use in Honduras over the period 1984 to 1987 
found that the introduction of the CSM programme was associated with only a very 
small change in oral contraceptive use over the period 1984-87 (Janowitz, Suazo et 
al. 1992). 
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There may be geographic differences in market conditions that influence outcomes. 
(Agha and Davies 1998) found that in large cities in Pakistan, users of the 
subsidized CSM brand were mostly switching from commercial products, while in 
smaller cities (where average incomes are lower) there were more new users (7/10 
were switchers in large cities vs. 2/10 in small cities). 
 
A recent study of the distribution of socially marketed condoms in Zambia examined 
the types of outlets stocking the social marketing brand (Agha and Kusanthan 2003). 
It concluded that the marketing strategy of focusing distribution on outlets in low-
income neighbourhoods had a significant impact on improving condom availability 
among the urban poor. Demand-side evidence would be required to conduct a benefit 
incidence study which could look at the actual patterns of purchase.  
 
An ITN project in Malawi has experimented with trying to ‘segment’ the ITN market 
through product differentiation of nets as a way to improve the targeting of a subsidy 
towards poorer rural households (PSI, <http://www.psi.org/resources/pubs/itn.html>, 
accessed 4 May 2004). Two products are sold through the project. One is a round blue 
net, sold to distributors at a mark-up above the direct product cost, through 
commercial outlets. This product has been found to be more popular among urban 
households sleeping on beds. The other product is a square green net, sold at a subsidy 
on the direct product cost, through rural public sector health facilities. No evaluation 
of this programme is yet available. A similar project in Tanzania targeted a more-
subsidized, differentiated product towards pregnant women and children under 5 years 
through sales in MCH facilities (Hanson and Jones 2000). 
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DISCUSSION 
This chapter has reviewed the evidence regarding six different approaches to targeting 
resources towards the poor. A key finding from the review is the importance of 
programme design and implementation issues in explaining observed outcomes. For 
example, evaluation of the KINET voucher scheme in Tanzania found substantial 
undercoverage of key target groups, and attributed these in part to lack of knowledge 
about programme benefits and eligibility criteria (Mushi et al. 2003). The challenge of 
ensuring awareness among target populations is likely to arise across the whole range 
of targeting mechanisms. Successful programmes will need to identify these 
implementation issues and devote adequate resources (technical and financial) to 
overcoming them.  
 
Unfortunately, most studies in the literature focus on measuring targeting outcomes 
(coverage, undercoverage and leakage) and few studies document the critical ‘how 
and why’ issues which both explain these outcomes and provide insights into how 
problems can be resolved through more careful design and implementation. 
Exceptions are the work on health financing reforms in South Africa and Zambia 
(Gilson et al. 1999; Lake et al. 2000). There is clearly a need for more research in this 
area. Nonetheless, a few general lessons emerge from existing work. These relate to 
the availability of information, the importance of incentive effects and the potential 
cost of targeting.  
 
A critical issue is the availability of good information for programme design and 
evaluation. For resource allocation formulae, information is needed on population 
distribution and on indicators of deprivation (socio-economic or health-related). Also, 
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information is needed about the distribution of other sources of funding, so that the 
equity of the distribution of all resources can be looked at together, rather than 
focusing on the impact of individual sources. These other sources of funding will 
differ among contexts: in South Africa, it proved to be important to look at private 
insurance coverage; in Uganda, donor funding was an important source which needed 
to be considered in allocating the government budget. 
 
Identifying individual beneficiaries raises a host of other informational requirements. 
The skill needed to conduct individual-level means testing was identified in the 
Equity Fund in Cambodia, and social workers were used in place of health workers to 
do this. Measuring household income and expenditure is the ‘gold standard’ in some 
contexts for assessing household socio-economic status. However, rural livelihoods 
may be more complex in their seasonality, the importance of non-cash resources and 
the interlinkages among households. In evaluating household socio-economic status 
progress has been made recently in using ‘asset indices’ which combine indicators of 
housing material and household asset ownership into a single measure (for more 
information see 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAH/Resources/Publications/Quantitative-
Techniques/health_eq_tn04.pdf>, accessed 17 March 2005; Zeller et al. 2001).  
 
A second issue is the importance of the incentive effects that targeting mechanisms 
may create to providers and users. For example, one reason why user fee exemption 
schemes have usually failed to protect the poor is that they are perceived to conflict 
with revenue generation to the health facility. This incentive may be magnified to the 
extent that health workers benefit directly from the user fee revenue (for example, 
 31 
through bonus payments), reducing their incentive to grant exemptions. The Equity 
Fund example from Cambodia is a promising approach to break the link between 
facility revenue and providing exemptions. In addition, strategic use of incentives can 
help to increase desired outcomes, as in the case of incentives to traditional birth 
attendants to refer mothers for institutional deliveries in Cambodia. On the user side, 
the design of targeting approaches needs to recognize the other financial and non-
financial costs faced by users in taking up the targeted benefit. If the subsidy is only 
partial, cash constraints may still impede the poor from taking up the benefit. Other 
costs may be incurred in terms of time or travel costs, and there may be psychological 
costs such as stigma involved in taking up a targeted benefit. These barriers to uptake 
can be substantial. For example, in Tanzania, in their evaluation of a discount voucher 
system for targeting treated bed nets, Mushi et al. (2003) reported that only 12 per 
cent of women used the vouchers after 2 years. 
 
A third issue is the potential cost of targeted approaches. In general, there is little 
evidence about the cost of targeting, yet the little information that is available 
suggests that individual targeting can be costly (Devereux 1999). The costs of 
targeting in the PROGRESA programme in Mexico were estimated at 30 per cent of 
total programme cost, though this may have been particularly expensive because of 
the costs of household surveys needed to assess individual household eligibility 
within the targeted geographic areas. More generally, direct targeting costs are the 
costs of identifying eligible recipients and excluding non-eligibles. This may require 
additional structures, for example, social workers to screen potential individual 
recipients, and even when this task is undertaken by existing staff there is an 
opportunity cost to this time. These costs may be hidden if responsibility for 
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identifying beneficiaries lies with unpaid community representatives. In this case, 
there are issues of fairness and, potentially, of sustainability common to all volunteer 
programmes. Self-selection incurs no direct targeting cost, but this needs to be set 
against the costs of product differentiation and branding, although these costs are 
largely fixed and should therefore decrease with programme size. The costs of 
targeting need to be compared with the alternative of universal benefits (see Chapter 
7 [BENNETT]) to gain a full understanding of the relevant tradeoffs.  
 
As noted above, most evaluations in this area have focused on the main targeting 
outcomes (coverage, undercoverage and leakage). They have neglected the other 
issues of concern to policymakers such as cost and sustainability; and the importance 
of implementation issues is only beginning to be recognized. Future research in this 
area needs to consider a broader range of outcomes, and more systematically compare 
the costs and consequences of alternative methods of directing resources towards 
those most in need. 
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Table 8.1 Classification of targeting mechanisms by approach and method 
 
Method Mechanism Examples 
Individual assessment User fee exemptions (on 
grounds of poverty) 
 
Cash transfers 
Exemptions + equity fund in 
Cambodia 
 
PROGRESA (Mexico) 
Categorical/geographic Resource allocation formula 
Contracting NGOs to provide 
primary health care in rural 
areas  
User fee exemptions (using 
demographic categories) 
Cash transfers 
Vouchers 
South Africa, Zambia  
 
Cambodia, Guatemala, 
Senegal, Madagascar 
 
Many countries 
 
 
Nicaragua, Honduras 
ITNs to pregnant women in 
Tanzania, seeds for farmers 
affected by drought in East 
Africa, health services for 
sex workers in Nicaragua 
Self-selection Market segmentation: 
Programme decisions 
needed about what products 
to offer, how they will be 
differentiated (quality, 
price, quantity, outlet) and 
whether to reinforce 
through targeted marketing 
or information  
Social marketing of 
condoms, contraceptives 
and ITNs 
 
 
 
Table 8.2. Two-by-two classification of targeting outcomes 
 Intended/targeted beneficiary 
Actual beneficiary Yes No 
Yes A B 
No C D 
Coverage = A/(A+C) 
Leakage = B/(A+B) 
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Table 8.3 Typology of targeting approaches with examples 
 
Targeting mechanism, 
example
a
 
What is targeted Who is target group Targeting method Evaluation criteria 
Resource allocation 
formulae (South Africa, 
Zambia) 
Public health expenditure Poor people  
People with greater health need 
Geographic  Equalization of (weighted) per 
capita expenditure 
Provision of primary 
health care (PHC) in 
rural areas 
PHC expenditure (usually 
primary care facilities) 
Poor people Broad (type of service) 
Geographic 
Coverage 
Leakage 
Contracting NGOs to 
provide PHC in rural 
areas 
Contracted health services  People living in rural areas Geographic Service utilization in lower socio-
economic groups 
Health expenditure in lower socio-
economic groups 
User fee exemptions Exemptions from payment 
for services 
Poor individuals 
Demographic groups 
People with specific conditions 
(e.g. tuberculosis) 
Direct 
Categorical 
Coverage of target groups 
 
Equity fund Exemptions from payment 
for services 
Poor individuals Direct Coverage 
Leakage 
Cost per beneficiary 
Cost per capita 
Cash transfers Cash  Poor people Geographic  
Geographic + direct 
Coverage 
Leakage 
Vouchers for sex workers 
in Nicaragua 
Sexual health services Sex workers 
 
Direct Sexually transmitted infections 
treated 
Vouchers for ITNs in 
Tanzania 
Subsidy for insecticide-
treated mosquito net 
Pregnant women 
Children <5 
Characteristic Coverage 
Leakage 
Social marketing of 
contraceptives 
Public health commodities People in lower socio-economic 
groups 
Self-selection Coverage 
Leakage (switching) 
Social marketing of ITNs Subsidized ITNs Untargetedb 
Groups most vulnerable to 
malaria 
Poor households 
Self-selection 
Characteristic 
Coverage 
a See text for references. 
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b Most projects do not directly target subsidies. The Malawi project targeted poor households by product differentiation and self-selection. The SMITN (Social Marketing of 
Insecticide Treated Nets) project in Tanzania initially marketed a more-subsidized, differentiated product for sales to pregnant women and children <5 through health 
facilities. 
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Table 8.4 Comparison of targeting approaches across three cash transfer programmes 
in Central America 
 
Honduras Mexico Nicaragua 
1) National survey data 
used to identify the 70 
municipalities with the 
highest rates of 
stunting, and 40 of 
these randomly 
selected.  
2) All households with 
children under 3 years 
or pregnant women are 
eligible. 
3) Transfer worth 
$4/month. 
4) Recipients must keep 
up to date with 
prenatal checkups, 
growth monitoring and 
vaccinations. 
1) Fourteen states 
selected using multiple 
criteria, including the 
numbers of poor 
people. 
2) Locality-level 
marginality index 
calculated. 
3) Household-level 
poverty index 
calculated within 
targeted localities. 
4) Health and nutrition 
component transfer 
worth $13/month. 
5) Recipients must attend 
preventive health 
checkups; nutrition and 
health education 
sessions for pregnant 
women, children under 
2, and malnourished 
children aged 2-5.  
1) Two departments 
selected on basis of 
poverty rates and 
accessibility of social 
services infrastructure. 
2) Municipalities selected 
which were involved in 
a planning 
intervention. 
3) Within municipalities, 
all census districts 
ranked on basis of 
marginality index, 
intervention 
implemented in 
randomly selected half 
of the poorest.  
4) All households within 
selected census 
districts eligible for 
universal transfer 
except those owning a 
vehicle and larger 
landowners. 
5) Transfer worth 
$19/month. 
6) Recipients must attend 
health education, 
attend child growth 
monitoring sessions, 
keep vaccinations up to 
date.  
Source: Adapted from (Mesoamerica Nutrition Program Targeting Study Group 
2002). 
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1 In this context, leakage refers to an error of targeting, rather than to its common use 
as a euphemism for losses due to stealing or corruption.  
